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ABSTRACT
DUTY- VS. RIGHT-FOCUSED MINDSETS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH
PROSOCIALITY
MAY 2017
SEYED NIMA ORAZANI
B.A., SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY TEHRAN
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Bernhard Leidner
Five studies investigated the links between rights-focused (RFM) and dutyfocused mindsets (DFM) and prosociality. Making salient both RFM and DFM in a
within-participants designs, Studies 1-2 examined the relationships of RFM and DFM
with a number of outcomes related to prosocial attitudes. Results indicated that RFM and
DFM both uniquely increased prosociality. Experimentally inducing either RFM or DFM
in a between-participants design, Study 3 found that RFM had stronger effects on
prosocial outcomes than DFM. Further, Study 3 showed that this relative advantage of
RFM over DFM in boosting prosociality was due to RFM (relative to DFM) increasing
people’s perceived importance and relevance of individualizing morality (harm and
fairness). Study 4 thus explored the possibility that RFM’s greater default potential to
increase prosociality is due to the inherent focus of rights on individuality, and whether,
by the same token, DFM strengthen its potential to increase prosociality as long as the
situation is highly individualized. Adding a baseline to the design of Study 3, and using a
vignette paradigm, Study 4 showed that in a context of interpersonal helping (i.e., a
highly individualized context), relative to baseline both RFM and (especially) DFM
increased people’s prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions. In a 2x2 design, Study 5
experimentally manipulated mindsets (RFM vs. DFM) as well as individuality (high vs.
low, asking participants to think about someone in their inner or outer social network). In
line with the individuality explanation, there was a general effect of individuality,
prosociality being higher (across both RFM and DFM conditions) when participants

iv

thought about someone in their inner rather than outer social network. Together, these
studies provide evidence for the prosocial potential of RFM; illuminate the roots of this
potential; and, by doing so, show a way to leverage this knowledge to increase the
prosocial potential of DFM.
Keywords: Rights, Duties, Prosociality, Values, Morality
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The modern age is an age of rights. People tend to construe the reality they
live in based on a rights framework, leading to frequent invocations of rightsrelated concepts—be it demands for (social) justice, equality, fairness, among
others (Finkel & Moghaddam, 2005; Moghaddam, Slocum, Finkel, Mor, & Harré,
2000). From a psychological perspective, this focus of modern humans on rights
starts in the human mind and therefore operates first and foremost at the level of
the individual. Individual-level phenomena should, however, if they are highly
prevalent, also emerge at the collective level. Indeed, the claim for the existence
and prevalence of a rights-focused mindset (RFM) finds support in observations
of behavior in human groups/collectives and societies, for example the numerous
social movements aiming at the promotion of a vast array of rights (e.g., human
rights, minority rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, etc.). However, at the
same time that these society-level manifestations of RFM demonstrate the high
rate at which people make use of rights (framings) to create social change, these
very same manifestations of RFM also demonstrate that there still is a high rate at
which rights are violated all around the world (Louis & Taylor, 2005).
Hence, there exists both a great need to reduce rights violations through
positive social change, and a great expectation for RFM to deliver this positive
social change. Importantly, as shown by the scholarly literature on rights and their
effects on behavior (Finkel & Moghaddam, 2005), this expectation exists among
both laypeople and scholars. Thus, it is crucial from both a scholarly and a realworld perspective, and for both the testing and advancement of existing theory as
1

well as its practical implications, to put the presumed potential of RFM for the
promotion of prosociality to the empirical test.
More recently, the budding social psychological literature on the morality
of rights has shifted its exclusive focus on rights to a broader focus on rights and
duties (Finkel & Moghaddam, 2005; Moghaddam et al., 2000). An ontological
analysis of rights (Harré, 2005) makes it clear that, at least in interpersonal
contexts, RFM is likely to go hand in hand with DFM: if one has rights, so have
others; therefore, as much as everyone has rights, it is everyone’s duty not to
violate others’ rights. From a psychological perspective, then, duty focused
mindsets might complement rights focused mindsets, and have a similar potential
for the promotion of prosocial attitudes and behavior. Thus, I will investigate the
links of both RFM and DFM to prosociality. Given the nascent state of the
psychological literature and the scarcity of empirical research on the morality of
rights and, in particular, duties (Bhatia, 2000; Passini, 2011), I start by exploring
these links briefly from a historical point of view, before using research in moral
psychology to develop a psychological understanding of these links in terms of
mindsets (i.e., RFM and DFM) and the mechanisms (i.e., values such as
universalism or benevolence, and the individualizing moral foundations of harm
and fairness) through which these mindsets may unfold their purported potential
for the promotion of prosocial attitudes and behavior. Using different methods,
designs, and samples, five studies then examine these links and mechanisms
empirically. In doing so, these studies contribute to moral psychology in general,
and to research on the morality of rights and duties in particular.

2

1.1 Rights and Duty Frameworks and Mindsets
From 1914 to 1945 around 70 million people were killed in two world
wars. Two atomic bombs were dropped for the first time in the history of
humankind, and about 6 million Jews were systematically murdered during the
Holocaust. Prisoners of war in Asia and Europe were kept in inhumane
conditions. The list goes ever on. Ultimately, these catastrophic events sparked
the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR; United
Nations, 1948), an international effort to prevent the recurrence of the horrors of
the first half of the 20th century by requiring people and nation states to mutually
accord each other certain rights (e.g., the right to life). This lofty goal was to be
achieved by two core elements of the UDHR. First, the codification of rights as
inviolable should protect the individual’s dignity and freedom against any state,
government, organization, and entity that has power over people. Second, the
codification of rights as universal should ensure that they will be respected by all
people, for all people—regardless of nationality, gender, religion, ethnicity, or
language. Indeed, there is some evidence that the UDHR has been effective to
some degree. Since its creation, the rate of human rights violations has decreased
while the respect for human rights has increased (Passini, 2011; Staerkle,
Clemence, & Doise, 1998; for a historical review, see Pinker, 2011). Further,
endorsement of human rights has been linked to self-reported human rights
behavior (Cohrs et al., 2007).
Yet, human rights violations still remain commonplace around the world,
even in countries that are generally seen as highly advanced in the domain of
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human rights (e.g., the U.S.; see Louis & Taylor, 2005). The persistence of social
problems and the need for positive social change has brought the realization that a
focus on rights, while helpful and perhaps necessary for the promotion of human
prosociality, may not be sufficient. This realization led to the creation of the
Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities (DHDR, United Nations,
1998). Fifty years after the proclamation of the UDHR, the DHDR was meant to
reinforce the global enforcement of human rights. In this sense, UDHR and
DHDR – or, from a more psychological perspective, rights- and duty-focused
mindsets – are argued to be two different vehicles for positive social change
powered by a very similar engine: their potential to increase prosociality.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the hope for the DHDR to increase the
UDHR’s effectiveness suggests an implicit expectation for duty-focused mindsets
to possibly have an even greater potential to promote prosociality than rightsfocused mindsets.
The global emphasis on the use of rights- and duty-based frameworks to
effect positive social change, and these frameworks’ rootedness in human
psychology, highlights the importance of testing the effects of rights- and dutyfocused mindsets on prosocial attitudes and behavior. While the expectation for
such effects to occur on a global level – to quite literally transform the world –
may appear unrealistic, there is reason to not discount this possibility completely.
As research has shown, people across various countries and cultures have a
substantially shared understanding/conceptualization – if not necessarily
endorsement/support – of human rights (Clemence & Doise, 1995; Doise, 1993,
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2002; McFarland, 2015; Spini & Doise, 2005). Thus, if rights- (and/or duty-)
focused mindsets were to have positive effects on people’s prosociality, then such
effects may well generalize across cultures (rather than being culturally bound).
Further, besides answering the question of whether or not RFM and DFM have
positive effects on prosociality, it is also important to explore the underlying
mechanisms of these effects. In this regard, the international discourse on rights
and duties, as well as various scholarly literatures, point to the moral aspects of
the concepts of rights and duties playing a key role.
1.2 The Morality of Rights and Duties
Drawing on the nascent research on rights and duties as well as on
research in moral psychology, I propose that RFM and DFM unfold their
purported potential for the promotion of prosociality by increasing the salience of
certain concepts related to moral behavior. While there is a great variety of factors
relevant to moral behavior and prosociality, the studies I report below focus on
those factors that are widely considered most fundamental to human morality.
Anthropological, cultural, sociological, and psychological research has
identified ten values that shape individual behavior and group life in most known
(modern) human societies (e.g., Schwartz, 2012). Of these ten “basic human
values,” universalism and benevolence have been strongly implicated in prosocial
behavior in general and behavior related to human rights in particular (Cohrs et
al., 2007), and therefore they are the most relevant to the research question of
interest here. The values people hold have also been categorized based on whether
they primarily reflect an orientation towards the self or towards others/the
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community (Trapnell and Paulhus, 2012). The former category of agentic values
includes values such as power, wealth, influence, achievement, competence, and
autonomy, whereas the latter category of communal values includes values such
as compassion, humility, and forgiveness.
Similar and related to research on values, anthropological, cultural, and
psychological research have also made efforts to identify the foundations of
human morality. One such effort has highlighted the important role that
autonomy, community, and divinity have in individual and group living (for a
review see Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 2003). Building on this work,
Moral Foundations Theory has distinguished between the moral foundations of
harm/care and fairness/reciprocity on the one side, and the moral foundations of
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity on the other (for reviews
and extensions see Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2012;
Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013, in press). While all five moral foundations have
been linked to prosociality, the former two foundations primarily influence
prosociality towards the individual, whereas the latter three foundations primarily
influence prosociality towards the community. Thus, they have been referred to as
individualizing morality and binding morality.
While there is no empirical research on the relationship of individualizing
or binding morality with rights- or duty-focused mindsets, the heavy focus of the
human rights discourse on the rights of and prosociality towards the individual
suggests that individualizing morality may perhaps play an even bigger role in the
prosocial potential of RFM than binding morality. To the extent that the discourse
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on duties very much builds on the historically older discourse on rights and
therefore (perhaps somewhat surprisingly) shares its primary focus on the
individual (relative to the group/community), it is also true for DFM that
individualizing may play an even bigger role in its prosocial potential than
binding morality. At the same time, however, given that the concept of duty is
more related to groups then the concept of rights, it is plausible to expect that
binding morality should, if anything, play a role for DFM, less so for RFM. In
other words, between individualizing and binding morality, individualizing
morality may be the more important one for both RFM and DFM to unfold their
prosocial potential. Binding morality may also play an additional role, especially
for DFM. From this perspective, in line with the expectation of the international
community that DHDR may strengthen the effectiveness of UDHR even further,
duty focused mindsets may have an even greater prosocial potential than rights
focused mindsets.
1.3 Overview of Studies
While all five studies investigated the linkages of RFM and DFM to prosociality,
and to what extent values and morality play a role in them, the sets of measures/variables
they employed differed to some degree (but, importantly, also overlapped to some
degree). Values were assessed in terms of the basic human values of universalism and
benevolence, agentic and communal values, and selfishness; morality was assessed in
terms of individualizing and binding moral foundations, as well as prescriptive and
proscriptive moral norms; and prosociality was assessed in terms of willingness to help
individuals and groups of people, empathy, altruism, attitudes toward social and
distributive justice, and attitudes toward human rights. Studies 1 and 2 examined the
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relationships of RFM and DFM with prosociality (and values and morality) within
participants, using correlational designs. Studies 3-5 did so between participants, using
experimental designs. Study 3 tested RFM and DFM against each other in terms of their
effects on prosociality (through values and morality), and Study 4 tested the effects of
both RFM and DFM against a baseline. Study 4 also made a first step in testing whether
an individualized helping context might hold the key to unleashing the full potential of
RFM and DFM, using a vignette paradigm to make such a context salient. Finally, Study
5 experimentally manipulated both the type of mindset (RFM vs. DFM) as well as
individuality (high vs. low) in a 2x2 design, providing a causal test of the “individuality
explanation.”
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1

2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
The sample consisted of 533 participants recruited on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). After excluding six participants who were not born in the United
States, and two participants who were not native speakers, 525 participants were
retained for data analysis (306 female, five did not indicate gender; age: M =
38.33, SD = 13.48, range = 18-75).
2.1.2 Procedure
In a within-subject design participants were asked to do two tasks presented in
random order. The tasks instructed participants to make a list of the rights and
duties, respectively, they considered most important to possess/fulfill. In the
rights task, participants were asked to list both natural and legal rights. We
described natural rights to participants as “the rights that people enjoy as
individuals, these rights are universal and apply to all people and are not derived
from the laws of any specific society such as right to life.” Legal Rights were
described to participants as “those rights that people enjoy as citizens and they are
based on societies’ customs and laws such as right to vote.” In the duty task,
participants were asked to list both things they consider their duty to do and things
they consider their duty not to do. For each task, participants were provided with
ten blank spaces / text-entry boxes and asked to fill in at least five. Besides the
tasks, participants responded to the dependent measures in the order described
below on a scale from 1 to 9; unless noted otherwise, the endpoints of these scales
9

were labeled Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. The survey software presented
participants either first with the tasks and then with the dependent measures, or
the other way around, at random.
2.1.3 Measures
2.1.3.1 Mindsets
2.1.3.1.1 Right-focused mindset
We created RFM (M = 10.31, SD = 2.78) by adding up the number of natural and
legal rights participants listed.

2.1.3.1.2 Duty-focused mindset
We created DFM (M = 7.53, SD = 4.98) by adding up the number of otheroriented duties (i.e., should-do and should-not-do duties participants believed they
had toward other people). Self-oriented duties (i.e., should-do and should-not-do
duties participants believed they had toward other people; M = 1.23, SD = 1.67)
were created separately and not included in the DFM score.
2.1.3.2 Values and morality
2.1.3.2.1 Basic human values
Adapted from Schwartz (2012), two items measured the degree to which
participants believed in benevolence, that is, in preserving and enhancing the
welfare of others (e.g., “It is important to me to be loyal to my friends. I want to
devote myself to people close to me,” “It is important to me to help the people
around me. I want to care for their well-being”; r(525) = .55, p = < .001, M =
7.32, SD = 1.34). Another two items measured the extent to which participants
believed in universalism, that is, the “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature” (“I believe all the worlds’
10

people should live in harmony,” “Promoting peace among all groups in the world
is important to me,” “I want everyone to be treated justly, even people I do not
know. It is important to me to protect the weak in society”; r(525) = .59, p = <
.001, M = 7.49, SD = 1.44).
2.1.3.2.2 Selfishness
Five items measured the extent to which participants believed that pursuing selfinterest goals should take priority in their lives (e.g., “If everybody would follow their
self-interest, altogether it would benefit society,” “If all people pursued only their selfinterest, it would eventually hurt society as a whole” [reversed scored]; α = .75, M =
4.15, SD = 1.44).

2.1.3.2.3 Moral foundations
Adapted from Graham and his colleagues (2012), we used the short form of the
moral foundation questionnaire to measure the extent to which participants relied
on individualizing moral foundations (𝛼 = .85, M = 7.26, SD = 1.23) and binding
moral foundations (𝛼 = .83, M = 5.04, SD = 1.55) when deciding whether
something is right or wrong. Two items were dropped from individualizing
morality due to item-total correlations less than .40.
2.1.3.2.4 Pre versus proscriptive norms
10 short scenarios described hypothetical situations sometimes happen in
everyday life. Each scenario described a situation in which a person needs to
make a decision. We asked participants then to what extent the person should (for
prescriptive items) or should not (for proscriptive items) engage in the behavior,
on scales from 1, Feel very strongly she/he should not do, to 9, Feel very strongly
she/he should do. Prescriptive (𝛼 = .56, M = 6.72, SD = 1.60) and proscriptive
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norms (𝛼 = .66, M = 2.94, SD = 1.48) were measured by five items each. Three
items from the prescriptive measure and one item from the proscriptive measure
were dropped due to the item-total correlations less than .40.
2.1.3.3 Prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions

2.1.3.3.1 Perceived responsibility toward social justice
Five items measured participants’ attitudes toward citizens’ responsibility to deal
with social and economic problems in order to have a better society (e.g. “It is
our responsibility, not just a matter of personal preference, to provide for groups
worse off in society,” “Increased economic equality is ultimately beneficial to
everyone in society”; 𝛼 =. 92, M = 6.56, SD = 1.90).
2.1.3.3.2 Distributive justice
Three items measured the extent to which participants believed that resources
were fairly distributed in their country (e.g. “How fairly are resources allocated
among U.S. citizens?”, “Overall, how fair do you think is your social economic
status in general?”; 𝛼 = .81, M = 4.07, SD = 1.86).
2.1.3.4 Demographics
Participants reported their gender and age.
2.2 Results
A paired t-test revealed that participants significantly listed more otheroriented duties than self-oriented duties, t = 15.87, p < .001; Mother-oriented duties –
Mself-oriented duties = 2.59. In order to compare the frequency of rights and othersoriented duties listed by participants we conducted a paired t-test. It revealed that
participants listed more rights than other-oriented duties, t = 12.43, p < .001;
12

difference of MRFM-MDFM = 2.78. When open-ended questions were presented at
the beginning of the survey participants listed more rights (Mfirst = 10.90)
compared to when they were presented at the end of the survey, Mlast = 9.86;
tpooled(416) = 3.87, p < .001. The same applied to other-oriented duties,
tsatterthwaite(341.72) = 4.87, p < .001; Mfirst – Mlast = 2.40.
Table 1. Correlation of RFM and DFM with main dependent variables (N = 417).
Measures

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1.

Social justice

2.

Distributive justice

-.39***

___

3.

Benevolence

.36***

-.13**

___

4.

Universalism

.61***

-.27***

.56***

___

5.

Selfishness

-.53***

.39***

-.33***

-.42***

___

6.

Prescriptive norms

.46***

-.21***

.40***

.45***

-.40***

___

7.

Proscriptive norms

.00

.01

.17***

.18***

-.11**

.09*

___

8.

Individual morality

.54***

-.26***

.51***

.42***

-.37***

.42***

.17***

9.

Binding morality

-.28***

.49***

.06

-.20***

.27

-.09*

.20***

-.05

___

10. RFM

.10*

-.15**

.14**

.15**

-.15**

.11*

.17***

.17***

-.05

___

11. DFM

.15***

-.05

.16***

.26***

-.22**

.14**

.12**

.16***

-.03

.40***

11

___

___

Table 1 shows the bivariate correlations between all measures. Not
surprisingly, RFM positively correlated with DFM. Both RFM and DFM
positively correlated with social justice, benevolence, individualizing morality,
and prescriptive norms. Both RFM and DFM positively correlated with
proscriptive norms and selfishness. Neither correlated with binding morality.
Only RFM correlated (negatively) with distributive justice, whereas DFM did not.

13

___

Table 2 shows the results of a multiple regressions predicting each dependent
variable by both RFM and DFM simultaneously. DFM predicted all dependent variables
but distributive justice and binding morality beyond RFM, while RFM predicted
distributive justice, universalism and proscriptive norms (but no other dependent
variables) beyond RFM.

Table 2. Regression coefficients after entering RFM and DFM as predictors.
Predictive variables
DFM

RFM

Criteria variables

B

SE B

b

t

p

B

SE B

b

t

p

Social justice

.14

.04

.18

3.47

.001

.02

.04

.03

0.61

.540

Distributive justice

-.01

.04

-.01

-0.15

.882

-.10

.04

-.14

-2.70

.007

Benevolence

.14

.03

.25

4.91

< .001

.02

.03

.04

0.85

.398

Universalism

.07

.03

.12

2.30

.022

.07

.03

.14

2.62

.009

Selfishness

-.13

.03

-.23

-4.37

< .001

-.03

.03

-.06

-1.24

.214

Prescriptive norms

.12

.03

.18

3.50

.001

.02

.03

.03

0.63

.529

Proscriptive norms

.08

.03

.13

2.55

.011

.06

.03

.11

2.15

.032

Individual morality

.12

.03

.24

4.67

< .001

.03

.02

.07

1.42

.156

Binding morality

.02

.03

.03

0.49

.627

-.03

.03

-.06

-1.09

.278

Using DFM and RFM as predictors I conducted a mixed analysis of variance
introducing universalism and benevolence as two fundamental values suggested by
Schwartz (2012) as repeated measures to see whether or not RFM and DFM have
identical power to predict these two types of values. DFM predicted positively both
universalism (F = 5.28, p = .022) and benevolence (F = 24.09, p < .001), whereas RFM
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just predicted positively universalism (F = 6.86, p = .009) but not benevolence (F = 0.72,
p = .016). Both two-way interaction terms, of DFM by value type (F = 5.81, p = .3982)
and RFM (F = 3.86, p = .050) by value type, were significant. This means that DFM
predicts benevolence significantly more than it predicts universalism; and RFM predicts
universalism but not benevolence.

I also ran a similar mixed analysis on individualizing and binding morality
as repeated factors. Both DFM (F = 21.79, p < .001) and RFM (F = 2.02, p =
.156) predicted individualizing morality, although the latter only marginally so.
Neither DFM (F = 0.24, p = .627) nor RFM (F = 1.18, p = .278) predicted binding
morality, although the direction of relation between RFM and binding morality
was opposite to the direction of relation between DFM and binding morality. The
two-way interactions of RFM by morality type (F = 2.85, p = .092) and DFM by
morality type (F = 5.94, p = .015) were significant, although the former was
marginal. This means that both RFM and DFM predict individualizing morality
significantly more than they predict binding morality.
2.3 Discussion
When participants were asked to list their duties they listed their duties
toward others rather than their duties toward themselves. This finding was in line
with my theoretical analysis in regard to the concept of duty as an “otheroriented” rather than “self-oriented” concept. Although the pattern of correlation
of duty and rights with DVs is to some extent identical, entering DFM into the
regression model revealed that DFM positively predicted social justice,
benevolence, individual morality, pre and proscriptive morality, and universalism.
It also negatively predicted selfishness. RFM though predicted proscriptive
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norms, distributive justice, and universalism. Moreover, participants listed more
rights than duties which is in line with the spirit of our age in which people are
mostly focused on rights rather than duties.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2

3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
We recruited 579 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
After excluding eleven participants who were not born in United States, and two
participants who were not native speakers, 566 participants were retained for data
analysis (320 female, five did not indicate gender; age: M = 36.39, SD = 12.68,
range = 18-78).
3.1.2 Procedure
Participants went through the same procedure as in Study 1 except the instruction
for indicating the most important rights and duties. Unlike Study 1 I did not
distinguish between natural and legal rights on the one hand, and between dutyto-do and duty-not-to-do on the other hand. Each section then had ten text entries.
We also did not mention anything about the owner of rights and duties. The
reason was that we wanted to see what perspective participants would choose
spontaneously when they write about rights and duties; would they write about
their rights and their duties toward others or they would rather write about others’
rights and other’s duties toward them? After writing their answers, participants
completed the dependent measures in the order described below on a scale from 1
to 9. Unless noted otherwise, the endpoints of these scales were labeled Strongly
Disagree to Strongly Agree.
3.1.3 Measures
3.1.3.1 Mindsets
17

3.1.3.1.1 Right-focused mindset
As in the first study we created the variable RFM adding up the number of
rights participants listed (M = 5.53, SD = 2.03).
3.1.3.1.2 Duty-focused mindset
As in our first study we created other- (M = 5.29, SD = 1.89) versus selforiented duties (M = .57, SD = 0.83). Self-oriented duties (M = 0.57, SD = 0.83)
were created by adding up the number of duties participants thought they had
toward themselves.
3.1.3.2 Values and morality
3.1.3.2.1 Basic human values
The same items as in Study 1 measured benevolence (r(566) = .48, p = <
.001, M = 7.21, SD = 1.30) and universalism (r(566) = .60, p = < .001, M = 7.34,
SD = 1.40).
3.1.3.2.2 Selfishness
The same items as in previous study measured selfishness (𝛼 = .69, M =
4.79, SD = 1.52). One item was dropped due to the item-total correlation less than
.40.
3.1.3.2.3 Agentic and communal values
Adapted from Trapnell and Paulhus (2012), we presented participants with
twelve agentic (e.g. power, superiority, pleasure, competence, achievement), and
twelve communal values (e.g. altruism, compassion, equality, honesty, trust).
Participants rated the relevant importance of each value as a guiding principle in
their lives, from 1, Not Important, to 9, Very Important. Both agentic and
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communal values formed one separate factor. We dropped three items from
agentic and one item from communal values whose item-total correlation were
below .40. After dropping these items, we had a satisfactory reliability, both for
agentic (𝛼 = .88, M = 5.14, SD = 1.55), and communal values (𝛼 = .91, M = 7.49,
SD = 1.12).
3.1.3.2.4 Moral foundations
The same items as in Study 1 were used to measure participants’
individual (𝛼 = .84, M = 6.96, SD = 1.25) and binding (𝛼 = .81, M = 5.38, SD =
1.58) moral foundations. One harm item and one loyalty item were dropped due
to item-total correlations less than .40.
3.1.3.2.5 Pre vs. proscriptive norms
Three items measured participants’ attitudes toward prescriptive norms (𝛼
= .67, M = 7.09, SD = 1.37) and five items measured their attitudes toward
proscriptive norms (𝛼 = .74, M = 2.98, SD = 1.61).
3.1.3.3 Prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions
3.1.3.3.1 Empathy
Using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), four items
measured participants’ empathic concern for others (𝛼 = .88, M = 6.91, SD =
1.50), and another four items measured participants' ability to take the perspective
of others (𝛼 = .87, M = 6.77, SD = 1.47).
3.1.3.3.2 Altruism
To assess participants’ altruism, I adapted five items from the Volunteer
Functions Inventory, a measurement instrument used to assess the motivations
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underlying volunteerism (VFI; Clary et al., 1998). The adapted items showed
excellent reliability (𝛼 = .92, M = 7.16, SD = 1.50).
3.1.3.3.3 Willingness to help people
Adapted from Frieze and Boneva (2001), seven items measured the extent
to which participants were willing to directly help people, (“When given the
opportunity, I enjoy aiding others who are in need,” “I used to help people in
need in person and directly”; 𝛼 = .86, M = 6.37, SD = 1.32).
3.1.3.3.4 Willingness to help community
Two items measured the degree to which participants were willing to help
the community they live in (“I try to offer my help with any activities the
community I live in is carrying out,” “I try to contribute to the community I live
in by any possible means”; r(566) = .71, p = < .001, M = 5.61, SD = 1.75).
3.1.3.3.5 Perceived responsibility toward social justice
The same items as in Study 1 measured participants’ attitudes toward social
justice (𝛼 = .91, M = 6.41, SD = 1.77).

3.1.3.3.6 Distributive justice
The same items as in Study 1 measured participants’ beliefs about how
fairly resources are distributed among the U.S. citizens (𝛼 = .77, M = 4.21, SD =
1.78).
3.1.3.4 Demographics
Participants reported their age and gender.
3.2 Results
As in Study 1, participants listed more other-oriented than self-oriented duties,
Mother-oriented duties – Mself-oriented duties = 4.90; t(554) = -50.51, p < .001. We conducted a paired
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t-test in order to see if there is any difference between the extent to which participants
had RFM vs. DFM. It revealed that participants significantly had more RFM than DFM,
t(554) = 3.45, p = .001; MRFM – Mothers-oriented duties = 0.29. The order of presenting the openended questions, whether at the beginning or at the end of the survey, did not have any
significant effect on the frequency of rights participants listed, tsatterthwaite(559.42) = 1.43, p
= .153; Mfirst – Mlast = 0.24, as well as duties, tpooled(553) = 0.52, p = .605; Mfirst – Mlast =
0.08.

Table 3. Correlations between all variables (N=566)
Measures

1

2

3

4

1-

Social justice

2-

Distributive justice

-.33***

___

3-

Benevolence

.33***

-.07

___

4-

Universalism

.55***

-.23***

.57***

5-

Prescriptive norms

6-

Proscriptive norms

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

___

.45

***

-.02
***

___

***

.41***

___

-.15***

.21***

.12**

.19***

***

***

***

***

-.08

-.15

*

.45

7-

Individual morality

.56

.44

8-

Binding morality

-.26***

.42***

.14***

-.09*

9-

Agentic values

-.14***

.33***

-.04

-.09

___

.08

.15***

.05

___

-.11**

-.20***

-.08*

.34***

___

***

***

***

***

-.05

___

.11**

-.03

.67***

10- Communal values

.36

-.07

.67

11- Willingness to help people

.46***

-.04

.65***

.57***

.57***

.17***

.54***

***

***

***

***

***

.22***

.56***

.16***

-.08

.70***

.74***

.66***

___

14- Perspective taking

.31***

-.03

.51***

.44***

.37***

.11*

.42***

.08*

.02

.55***

.56***

.48***

.55***

___

**

***

***

***

**

***

**

.09*

__

.10*

.10*

.47***

16- DFM

.11*

-.06

.15***

.16***

.15

.15***

.19

.09*

.72

___

.46***

.15

-.14

.72***

.57***

.12

.08

___

***

.67***

***

.59

***

-.06

-.12

.29

.21

.41***

.10

.58

.60

13- Empathy

15- RFM

.52

.30

.46

**

.60

.50

12- Altruism

*

-.11

**

.55

***

.21***

.50

***

***

***

.59

___

***

-.04

-.08

.17

.11**

.09*

.01

.18***

.14

21

.13

.12**

.18

.16***

.12

_

Table 3. continued
Measures

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17- Selfishness

-.55***

.44***

-.14***

-.32***

-.26***

-.11**

-.33***

.36***

.33***

-.19***

-.12**

-.29***

-.20***

-.12**

-.17***

-.11*

18- Willingness

.34***

.06

.44***

.37***

.38***

-.01

.36***

.16***

.18***

.42***

.59***

.47***

.45***

.40***

.00

.10*

to help
community

I also calculated the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
between our main variables (see Table 3). RFM correlated with all dependent
variables except agentic values, binding morality, and willingness to help the
community. DFM correlated with all dependent variables except distributive
justice, agentic values, and willingness to help community. The of multiple
regressions as in study 1 (using RFM and DFM as predictive variables and other
DVs as criteria) are shown in table 4.
Table 4. Regression coefficients after entering RFM and DFM as predictors.
Predictive variables
DFM

RFM

DF

B

SE B

b

t

p

DF

B

SE B

b

t

p

Social justice

1

.09

.04

.10

1.99

.047

1

.03

.04

.03

0.59

.557

Distributive justice

1

.00

.05

.00

-0.04

.970

1

-.12

.04

-.13

-2.69

.007

Benevolence

1

.09

.03

.13

2.73

.007

1

.03

.03

.05

1.08

.280

Universalism

1

.09

.04

.13

2.68

.008

1

.04

.03

.06

1.26

.208

Selfishness

1

.06

.03

.08

1.64

.102

1

.05

.03

.07

1.43

.154

Individual morality

1

.05

.03

.08

1.66

.097

1

.04

.03

.07

1.39

.164

Binding morality

1

.12

.04

.14

2.90

.004

1

-.09

.04

-.11

-2.32

.021

Criteria variables
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Prescriptive norms

1

.08

.03

.11

2.29

.022

1

.06

.03

.09

1.79

.074

Proscriptive norms

1

-.02

.04

-.03

-0.54

.587

1

-.12

.04

-.14

-3.00

.003

Willingness to help

1

.06

.03

.08

1.72

.086

1

.05

.03

.07

1.56

.075

1

.13

.04

.14

2.87

.004

1

-.07

.04

-.08

-1.70

.091

Agentic values

1

.05

.04

.06

1.23

.220

1

-.08

.04

-.10

-2.11

.035

Communal values

1

.09

.03

.15

3.20

.002

1

.03

.03

.06

1.24

.214

Altruism

1

.09

.04

.11

2.33

.020

1

.08

.04

.10

2.20

.028

Empathy

1

.05

.06

1.23

.217

1

.07

.04

.09

1.83

.067

Perspective taking

1

.07

.09

1.79

.075

1

.03

.04

.03

0.73

.466

people
Willingness to help
community

.04
.04

As in the previous study, using a mixed analysis while introducing RFM
and DFM as predictors and value type (universalism and benevolence) as repeated
measure revealed that DFM (F = 7.16, p < .001), but not RFM (F = 1.59, p =
.208), predicted universalism, as well as benevolence (F = 7.44, p = .007). RFM
however did not predict (F = 1.17, p = .280) benevolence. Neither the interaction
between value type and DFM (Fvalue type*DFM = 0.02, p = .886) nor the interaction
between value type and RFM (Fvalue type*RFM = 0.08, p = 783) were significant.
I also ran the same mixed analysis introducing individual and binding
morality as repeated factors. Both DFM (F = 6.92, p = .009) and RFM (F = 1.94,
p = .164) predicted individual morality, although the latter was marginal. Both
DFM (F = 8.40, p = .004) and RFM (F = 5.38, p = .021) predicted binding
morality, although the direction of relation between RFM and binding morality
was reverse. The interaction between RFM (F = 7.60, p = .006) and morality type
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was significant whereas the interaction between DFM (F = 1.63, p = .202) and
morality type were not, although the relation between RFM and binding morality
as in previous study was reverse. This means that RFM predicts individual
morality significantly more than it predicts binding morality.
3.3 Discussion
The results of Study 1 were replicated in this study. Again, asking people
to make a list of the most important duties led them to make a list of their duties
toward others rather than their duties toward themselves. Both RFM and DFM
were correlated with prosocial attitudes such as perceived responsibility toward
social justice, and benevolence as well as universal values such as universalism
and communal values. Moreover, both RFM and DFM were correlated with
prosocial and behavioral intentions such as willingness to help people and
altruism.
Entering DFM and RFM in a regression model, it was DFM but not RFM
that predicted social justice, benevolence, prescriptive norms, willingness to help
people, communal values, and individual morality, although the effect for the
latter was marginal. As in the previous study, RFM predicted distributive justice,
proscriptive norms, and agentic values. There is an important issue to be
addressed. In both studies I asked participants to make a list of the most important
duties and rights at the same time. In order to establish causality between RFM
and DFM and prosocial attitudes and other related DVs in the next study I used a
between-subject design so that participants first were primed with either the
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concept of right (RFM) or the concept of duty (DFM). Then they were asked to
answer to the related measures.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3

4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
283 Americans recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. After excluding four
participants who were not born in the United States, and one participant who was
not native speaker, 278 participants were retained for data analysis (168 female,
three did not indicate gender; age: M = 36.31, SD = 12.84, range = 18-79).
4.1.2 Procedure
In a between-subjects design, I randomly assigned participants to two
conditions. In one condition in order to prime RFM we asked participants an
open-ended question to make a list of what they consider to be the most important
rights. In the other condition in order to prime DFM we asked participants an
open-ended question to make a list of what they consider to be the most important
duties. They then were asked to complete the dependent measures on visual
analog scales from 1 to 9 in the order described below. Unless noted otherwise,
the scale endpoints were labeled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.
4.1.3 Measures
4.1.3.1 Mindsets
4.1.3.1.1 Rights-focused mindset
RFM (M = 5.68, SD = 1.63) was created by adding up the number of
rights participants listed.
4.1.3.1.2 Duty-focused mindset
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Other- (M = 5.46, SD = 2.09) versus self-oriented duties (M = 0.80, SD =
1.15) were extracted from participants’ responses. DFM were duties that
participants believed they had toward other people and self-oriented duties were
duties they believed they had toward themselves.
4.1.3.2 Values and morality
4.1.3.2.1 Basic human values
Adapted from Schwartz (2012), two items measured the degree to which
participants care for others (r(275) = .48, p < .001, M = 7.48, SD = 1.29), and two
items measured belief in universalism (r(275) = .57, p < .001, M = 7.38, SD =
1.51).
4.1.3.2.2 Agentic and communal values
Adapted from Trapnell and Paulhus (2012), we presented participants with
twelve agentic (e.g. power, superiority, pleasure, competence, achievement), and
twelve communal values (e.g. altruism, compassion, equality, honesty, trust).
Participants rated the relevant importance of each value as a guiding principle in
their lives, from 1, Not Important, to 9, Very Important. Both agentic and
communal values formed one separate factor. We dropped three items from
agentic and one item from communal values whose item-total correlation were
below .40. After dropping these items, we had a satisfactory reliability, both for
agentic (𝛼 = .90, M = 5.16, SD = 1.56), and communal values (𝛼 = .93, M = 7.43,
SD = 1.22). Due to the item-total correlation less than .4 we dropped two values
assessing agentic values.
4.1.3.2.3 Moral foundation
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Adapted from Graham and his colleagues (2012), we used the short form
of moral foundation questionnaire to measure the extent to which participants
relied on individual (𝛼 = .86, M = 7.05, SD = 1.40) vs. binding (𝛼 = .82, M =
5.46, SD = 1.61) moral foundations. Three items were dropped, one from harm,
one from fairness, and the other from loyalty due to item-total correlation less
than .40.
4.1.3.2.4 Pre vs. proscriptive norms
Adapted from Janoff-Bulman and collegues (2009), 10 short scenarios
described hypothetical situations yet totally possible to happen in everyday life.
Each scenario described a situation in which a person needs to make a decision.
We asked participants then to what extent the person should (for prescriptive
items) or should not (for proscriptive items) engage in the behavior presented,
from 1, Feel very strongly she/he should not do, to 9, Feel very strongly she/he
should do. Each of prescriptive (𝛼 = .71, M = 6.77, SD = 1.31) and proscriptive
norms (𝛼 = .67, M = 2.92, SD = 1.52) were measured by five items. Due to the
item-total correlation less than .4 we dropped one scenario assessing prescriptive
norms and two scenarios assessing proscriptive norms.
4.1.3.3 Prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions
4.1.3.3.1 Altruism
Adapted from Clary and his colleagues (1998), five items measured to
what extent altruistic motivation led participants to be willing to help other people
(𝛼 = .91, M = 7.17, SD = 1.49).
4.1.3.3.2 Willingness to help people
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Adapted from Frieze and Boneva (2001), four items measured the extent
to which participants were willing to directly help people (𝛼 = .84, M = 6.50, SD
= 1.52).
4.1.3.3.3 Perceived responsibility toward social justice
Four items measured participants’ attitudes toward their responsibility to
promote social justice in society (e.g. “It is our responsibility, not just a matter of
personal preference, to provide for groups worse off in society,”“It is important
for those who are better off to help provide resources for the most vulnerable
members of society”; 𝛼 = .88, M = 6.40, SD = 1.79).
4.1.3.3.4 Distributive justice
Three items measured participants’ attitudes about the fairness of
resources distribution in the country (e.g. “How fairly are resources allocated
among U.S. citizens?”, “Overall, how fair do you think is your social economic
status in general”; 𝛼 = .80, M = 4.29, SD = 1.92).
4.1.3.4 Additional measures
4.1.3.4.1 Perceived individual duty toward others
Two items measured participants’ perception of their individual duties to
the least well-off (“It is my personal duty to help people in need to the best of my
ability even though there are some governmental or nongovernmental
organizations to do so,” “Even if society has special organizations/groups to help
people in need, I still have the responsibility to help people in need”; r(275) = .75,
p = .001, M = 6.32, SD = 1.76).
4.1.3.4.2 Perceived self-other overlap
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Three items measured the extent to which participants were willing to
consider others as an important factor in their decision-making processes (e.g., “I
think when people make decision, they should consider the consequences not just
for themselves but for others as well,” “Other people’s thoughts and feelings play
a strong role in my decision-making”; 𝛼 = .86, M = 7.07, SD = 1.52).
4.1.3.5 Demographics
Participants reported their age and gender.
4.2 Results
I first calculated the correlation of RFM and DFM with other variables
(see Table 5).
Table 5. Correlation of RFM and DFM with dependent variables.
DFM (N = 131)

RFM (N = 144)

Benevolence

.18*

.10

Universalism

.13

.13

Individual morality

.21*

.13

Binding morality

-.03

-.10

Prescriptive norms

.18*

.15†

Proscriptive norms

.25**

.20*

.11

.11

-.20*

-.10

.11

.10

Agentic values

-.20*

-.13

Communal values

.23*

.25**

Altruism

.23*

.20*

Social justice
Distributive justice
Willingness to help people
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Self-other overlap

.26**

.15†

Perceived individual duty

.19*

.03

DFM was positively associated with benevolence, individual morality,
prescriptive norms, proscriptive norms, communal values, and altruistic
behaviors. On the other hand, RFM was associated with proscriptive norms,
communal values, and altruistic volunteerism.
We then compared the effect of priming DFM vs. RFM on all DVs using
GLM procedure in SAS (see Table 6). As in it indicated in table 6 there were a
significant difference between RFM and DFM such that those participants who
were primed with RFM had higher scores on universalism, individual morality,
prescriptive norms, communal values, and perceived self-other overlap. On the
other hand, those participants who were primed with DFM had significantly lower
scores on distributive justice.

Table 6. The effects of priming rights versus duties on DVs.
DV

Effect of Condition

Duties

Rights

condition

condition

DFbetween

F

p

η P2

M (SD)

M (SD)

Benevolence

273

1.47

.226

.01

7.38 (1.39)

7.57 (1.19)

Universalism

273

5.55

.019

.02

7.16 (1.63)

7.59 (1.38)

Individual morality

273

4.40

.037

.02

6.86 (1.44)

7.21 (1.35)

Binding morality

273

0.21

.644

.00

5.51 (1.54)

5.42 (1.68)

Prescriptive norms

273

6.40

.012

.02

6.57 (1.48)

6.96 (1.10)
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Proscriptive norms

273

1.92

.167

.01

3.16 (1.69)

2.89 (1.59)

Social justice

273

0.50

.481

.00

6.32 (1.80)

6.47 (1.78)

Distributive justice

273

3.67

.056

.01

4.52 (1.93)

4.08 (1.89)

Willingness to help people

273

2.49

.116

.01

6.35 (1.54)

6.64 (1.50)

Agentic values

273

1.24

.267

.00

5.27 (1.54)

5.06 (1.57)

Communal values

273

4.47

.035

.02

7.27 (1.32)

7.58 (1.12)

Altruism

273

1.32

.252

.00

7.06 (1.47)

7.27 (1.51)

Self-other overlap

273

2.97

.086

.01

6.91 (1.55)

7.22 (1.49)

Perceived individual duty

273

1.86

.173

.01

6.17 (1.78)

6.46 (1.73)

4.3 Discussion
In this study as in previous studies DFM was associated with benevolence,
individual morality, prescriptive, communal values, altruistic volunteerism, selfother overlap, and perceived individual duty. RFM, on the other hand, was
associated with proscriptive norms, communal values, and altruistic volunteerism.
In regard to the GLM analysis, I expected significant difference between
RFM vs. DFM condition such that DFM should have stronger effect on variables
that revolve around “others.” But contrary to my predictions the effect of RFM on
three variables—individual morality, prescriptive norms, and communal values—
was significantly stronger than DFM.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4

Study 1 and 2 consistently showed that DFM may have an advantage over
RFM. In Study 3 the same pattern emerged in terms of correlations, but after
comparing the effect of each condition, DFM vs. RFM on DVs, results showed
that RFM has some advantage over DFM. Especially the lower individualized
morality in the duty than the rights condition points to the possibility that this
unexpected disadvantage of duties in Study 3 could be mitigated by making the
same concept salient. To test this hypothesis in a more ecologically valid and real
context Iranian participants were presented a fictitious, but allegedly true,
scenario where a potential help-giver decides not to help an individual person who
needs it. Study 4 then tested whether or not using an individualized context may
mitigate the disadvantage of duties observed in Study 3, or even turn it into an
advantage of duties that we expected based on Study 1 and 2. To do so, we added
a baseline condition to the rights and the duty conditions.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
This study was conducted in Iran during the summer of 2015. A total of
309 Iranian participants (160 female; age: M = 34.25, SD = 11.38, range = 18-75)
were recruited in the big city of Mashhad from three different districts based on
their SES (low, medium, and high). Local experts, blind to the experiment’s
hypothesis, approached participants in the field and after obtaining participants’
consent handed over a scenario written on a piece of paper and waited for 1 to 2
minutes for participants to read it thoroughly. Interviewers, then, read all the
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questions aloud for participants and wrote participants’ answers on an answer
sheet. Before administering the questionnaire, the author sat down with all
interviewers and made sure that all of them had the same understanding of items
and scenarios in case they needed to answer participants’ questions about the
scenarios or the items.
5.1.2 Procedure
After designing the questionnaire in English, it was translated into Persian
(Farsi). Interviewers presented participants a fictitious but allegedly real scenario
in which a man was jogging very early in the morning in a park in Tehran. We
specifically described the situation as if there was no one in the park except the
man to be sure that the bystander effect would not interfere with our experiment.
During his exercise he sees another man on the ground, visibly in pain and alone.
He slowed down, thinking whether or not he should help the other man since it
was not obvious to him how badly the man needed his help. The scenario goes on:
Later on, this story became ‘viral’ on social media. The opinions on his
behavior differ widely. While some did not blame him for not helping, as the
situation was ambiguous, others believed that he should have. The Duties
condition was framed as if he is to blame since it was his duty to help the person
and he did not fulfill his duty, whereas the Rights condition was framed as if he is
to blame since he violated the person’s right to safety by not helping him. In the
control condition participants just read about the story and I did not mention
anything about how people reacted to this nor any argument to blame the man
who did not offer his help to the person needed it. After reading the scenarios,
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participants completed the dependent measures described below on a scales from
1 to 6. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Strongly
Disagree and Strongly Agree.
5.1.3 Measures
5.1.3.1 Attention check
Four questions assessed participants’ attention to the manipulation
materials (e.g., “What did he do after he saw the man in need?” and “Is there
someone else in the scene of incident?”).
5.1.3.2 Values and morality
5.1.3.2.1 Moral foundations
Same items as in previous studies measured participants’ individual (𝛼 =
.60, M = 4.35, SD = 0.90) and binding (𝛼 = .72, M = 4.51, SD = 0.96) morality.
Two items were dropped from harm and two items were dropped from fairness
due to the item-total correlation less than .40.
5.1.3.2.2 Perceived severity
Two items measured the extent to which participants perceived the
situation of the man in need as severe (“The situation that the person in need had
been caught in was severe,” “It was a serious incident in which the person in need
had been caught”; r(308) = .86, p < .001).
5.1.3.2.3 Perceived moral outrage
Two items assessed the degree to which participants were morally
outraged (“I am morally outraged by Siamak’s behavior,” “I feel morally

35

outraged when I think about what Siamak did”; r(306) = .58, p < .001; M = 3.67,
SD = 1.45).
5.1.3.2.4 Perceived need
One item assessed the extent to which participants believed the man was
in need (“How badly the man was in need?”; M = -2.48 [transformed item], SD =
0.33).
5.1.3.2.5 Perceived responsibility and attribution of blame
Four items assessed the extent to which participants thought Siamak
should take responsibility for not helping (e.g. “All of the treatment cost of the
person in need should be on the Siamak insurance,.” “Siamak should pay money
to the person in need, atonement, to compensate any injuries due to not receiving
help at the time he needed it”; 𝛼 = .78, M = 1.33, SD = 0.66), and two items
measured the degree to which participants believed that Siamak was blameworthy
(“It was Siamak to blame in the situation above”, “There is no reason to blame
Siamak in the situation above” [reverse-coded]; r(309) =.39, p < .001; M = 3.47,
SD = 1.38).
5.1.3.3. Prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions
5.1.3.3.1 Empathy
Three items measured to what extent participants sympathized toward the
person who needed help (e.g. “I feel empathy for the suffering of the person in
need,.” “I feel compassion for the person in need”; 𝛼 = .92, M = 3.23, SD = 1.31).
5.1.3.3.2 Willingness to help
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Two items measured participants’ willingness to help working children, a
realistic and usual scene in big cities like Mashhad (“I help working children in
street whenever I have the opportunity,” “When I see a working child in the street,
I somehow help him/her”; r = .67; p < .001; M = 2.84, SD = 1.06).
5.1.3.3.3 Perceived importance of rights
Two items measured the extent to which participants believe in
importance of rights (“IT is people’s right to receive the help they need.”, “In
situation like the one you just read people should decide based on one principle;
protecting others’ right to safety and health.”)
5.2 Results
Before analyzing the data, a severely skewed variable, perceived need,
was transformed (reversed squared). I then calculated the correlation of perceived
importance of rights and duties as a reason to help the person with other DVs
(Table 7).
Table 7. Correlation of perceived importance of duties and rights with other DVs
in three conditions.
DFM

Individual

RFM

Control

Perceived

Perceived

Perceived

Perceived

Perceived

Perceived

importance

importance

importance

importance

importance

importance

of duties

of rights

of duties

of rights

of duties

of rights

.46***

.41***

.13

.14

.17

.13

.46***

.36***

.03

.13

.07

.14

.15

.02

.20*

.06

.32**

.20*

.25**

.22*

.10

.20*

.23*

.12

morality
Binding
morality
Perceived need
Perceived
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severity
.35***

.22*

.35***

.18

.22*

.21*

Empathy

.31**

.26**

.43***

.20*

.30**

.23*

Willingness to

.26**

.09

.27**

.17

.15

-.01

.16

.15

.07

-.03

.08

-.08

-.01

.06

-.03

.08

.15

-.01

Perceived
outrage

blame
Willingness to
help people
Willingness to
punish

Subsequently, data was subjected to GLM analysis using SAS (Table 8).
Both RFM and DFM conditions had significant effects on people’s prosocial
attitudes compared to the baseline. Moreover, as indicated in the table below, the
effect of DFM on individual morality, perceived need, and willingness to help
were significantly higher than RFM.

Table 8. The effects of priming rights versus duties on DVs.
DV

Effect of Condition

Duties

Rights

Control

condition

condition

condition

DFbetween

F

p

η P2

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Individual morality

305

26.41

< .001

.15

4.56 (0.89)a

4.21 (0.67)b

3.73 (0.88)c

Binding morality

306

23.62

< .001

.13

4.21 (0.64)a

4.05 (0.44)b+

3.61 (0.81)c

Perceived need

303

12.95

< .001

.07

4.20 (1.56)a

3.83 (1.09)b

3.11 (1.91)c

Perceived severity

305

38.27

< .001

.20

3.91 (1.39)a

4.27 (1.10)b

2.78 (1.27)c

Perceived outrage

306

0.44

.644

.00

3.66 (1.45)a

3.77 (1.32)a

3.58 (1.56)a
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Empathy

306

2.54

< .001

.12

3.57 (1.36)a

3.50 (1.09)a

2.58 (1.22)b

Willingness to blame

306

10.34

< .001

.06

3.66 (1.47)a

3.77 (1.33)a

2.98 (1.22)b

Willingness to help people

305

22.77

< .001

.13

3.32 (1.09)a

2.76 (0.87)b

2.41 (0.98)c

Willingness to punish

306

2.05

.130

.01

1.43 (0.70)a

1.33 (0.64)ab

1.26 (0.51)b

Cells with shared subscripts did not differ significantly (p > .100); cells with different
subscripts differed significantly (p < .050); “+” indicates marginally significant
differences (.050 < p < .100).

5.3 Discussion
In a more ecologically valid and culturally different context, I found that
participants primed with DFM rather than RFM perceived the man’s need as more
severe and they were more willing to help people. Using an individualized context
in which an individual needed help, as I hypothesized, mitigated the disadvantage
of DFM and even turned it into an advantage over RFM. Equally important, as the
results indicated, RFM still had its own advantage compared to the baseline but
using an individualized context made DFM even more efficacious to elicit
prosocial attitudes. Study 4 replicated the positive effects of rights suggested by
study 3 while also showing the same or even greater positive effect of duties
initially expected based on Study 1 and 2, but not found in Study 3.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5

To replicate the results of Study 4, in Study 5 I manipulated the
individualized interpersonal situation/context in a 2 (high individualized [a close
person] vs. low individualized [a distant person]) x2 (RFM vs. DFM) design. If it
is true that RFM and DFM become equal in terms of people prosociality as long
as there is a highly individualized interpersonal situation, as we explained the
results of Study 3 and 4, then in this design of Study 5 RFM and DFM should
both be higher in the high individualized condition than in the low individualized
condition; and at the same time rights and duties should not differ in the high
individualized conditions, nor should rights and duties differ in the low
individualized conditions. In other words, we expected the main effect of high vs.
low individualized situation to be significant and the interaction between
individualized situation and the RFM vs. DFM to be nonsignificant.
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Participants

546 American participants recruited via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After
excluding 13 people who were not native speakers, 25 people who did not write a
summary about how they understand the right/duty to safety as part of the
manipulation process, eleven people who wrote a distant person in the close
condition (one participant) or a close person in the distant condition (10
participants), five participants who wrote something random as the summary, four
participants who used significantly more time to read the prompt had been used as
manipulation, and three participants who used less than a three second to read the
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prompt, 485 participants were retained for data analysis (290 female, and 7 did
not answer, age M = 39.66, SD = 13.82, range = 18-84).
6.1.2 Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions.
Participants were asked to first read a statement either about the right to safety
(RFM condition) or duty to care (DFM condition) and then write a short summary
about how they understand this right/duty. In this study drawing on social
network literature (Dunbar, 2014; Pollet, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2013) I
operationalized individualized context by asking participants to think about either
a person to whom they felt close (close condition)—that is, a person who they
turn to at difficult times to seek support, or to think about a stranger—a person to
whom participants did not have any negative feelings but still were not close to
(distant condition). I then asked participants to write down the name of the person
they had in their mind in order to strengthen the experimental manipulation. After
writing the summary and the name of the person (close or distant), participants
were asked to indicate their opinion on varied measures on visual analog scales
from 1 to 9 described below. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints will be
labeled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.
6.1.3 Measures
6.1.3.1 Attention check
Two items measured the emotional distance participants felt to the person
they listed as either a close or distant person: “Would you turn to … for help or
comfort in times of severe personal problems (e.g. financial, health, death of a
loved one)?”, “How close do you feel emotionally to …?” These items were
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designed to ensure that participants genuinely felt close or distant to the person
they were asked to choose.
6.1.3.2 Values and morality
6.1.3.2.1 Basic human values
As in previous studies two items adapted from Schwartz (2012) measured
the degree to which participants held the value of benevolence (r(485) = .63, p <
.001, M = 7.60, SD = 1.23), and another two items measured the degree to which
participants held the value of universalism (r(485) = .73, p < .001, M = 7.63, SD =
1.34).
6.1.3.3 Prosocial attitudes and behavioral intentions
6.1.3.3.1 Empathy
I measured empathic concern (𝛼 = .84, M = 6.75, SD = 1.55), perspective
taking (𝛼 = .77, M = 6.35, SD = 1.42), and personal distress (𝛼 = .85, M = 5.35,
SD = 1.88) using the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Four items
were used for each of these three IRI subscales.
6.1.3.3.2 Altruism
Ten items from the Belief in the Existence of True Altruism scale (BETA;
Gebauer, Sedikides, Leary, & Asendorpf, in press) measured the extent to which
participants believe in selflessness of human nature in doing good deeds toward
others (𝛼 = .94, M = 6.23, SD = 1.67).
6.1.3.3.3 Attitudes toward human rights (BHR)
McFarland’s (2015) human rights questionnaire measured the extent to
which participants endorse human rights (𝛼 = .93, M = 6.16, SD = 1.92).
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6.1.3.3.4 Generosity
Adapted from Smith (2009), four items measured the extent to which
participants were willing to be generous toward others (e.g., “I’m the kind of
person who is willing to go the “extra mile” to help take care of my friends,
relatives, and acquaintances,” “When friends or family members experience
something upsetting or discouraging I make a special point of being kind to
them”; 𝛼 = .93, M = 6.80, SD = 1.95).
6.1.3.3.5 Perceived responsibility toward social justice
As in previous studies five items measured the extent to which participants
feel responsible to promote social justice in the society (𝛼 = .90, M = 6.64, SD =
1.71).
6.1.3.4 Additional measures
6.1.3.4.1 Perceived self-other overlap
Three items as in previous studies measured the extent to which
participants consider other people when they want to make decisions (𝛼 = .89, M
= 7.39, SD = 1.32).
6.2 Results
A test of ANOVA revealed that participants in the close condition (M =
8.24, SD = 1.20) were significantly (F = 1388.42, p < .001) more willing to turn
to the person they introduced as a close person compared to the distant condition
(M = 2.48, SD = 1.94). They also felt significantly (F = 1767.41, p < .001) closer
(M = 8.16, SD = 1.04) to the person they chose as a close person than the person
they chose as a distant person (M = 2.55, SD = 1.66). There was no significant
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effect of RFM vs. DFM on both questions (Fs < 7.30, ps > .094). There was also
no interaction effect of the two IVs on the questions (Fs < 2.00, ps > .450).
Using the GLM procedure in SAS all dependent variables were subjected
to two-way ANOVAs with RFM vs. DFM and close vs. distant person as
independent variables and their interactions. Differences in degrees of freedom on
different dependent variables (DVs) were due to differences in the number of
missing values. All results for the main effects of DFM vs. RFM and close vs.
distant person are shown in Table 9. Means and standard deviations for each
dependent variable are shown in Table 10 and 11.
Table 9. Main effects of the two conditions on DVs.
DV

DFwithin

Social justice
Benevolence
Universalism
Human rights
Empathic concern
Perspective taking
Personal distress
Self-other overlap
Generosity
Altruism

416
416
416
416
416
416
416
416
416
416

Main effect of RFM vs. DFM
F
0.88
1.55
6.13
3.21
4.77
4.61
0.00
0.61
0.81
2.93

p
.349
.213
.014
.074
.030
.032
.950
.436
.367
.088

η P2
.00
.00
.01
.01
.01
.01
.00
.00
.00
.01

Main effect of high vs. low
individualized context
F
p
η P2
0.02
.893
.00
8.07
.005
.02
9.66
.002
.02
4.64
.032
.01
0.94
.333
.00
0.32
.571
.00
0.39
.531
.00
1.77
.184
.00
406.28
< .001
.49
0.58
.446
.00

As indicated in the table above, there was a main effect of emotional
closeness on benevolence, universalism, believing in human rights and generosity.
There was also a main effect of RFM vs. DFM on universalism, empathic
concern, and perspective taking.
Table 10. Means (standard deviations) by level of individualized
context.
Social justice
Benevolence

High
6.73 (1.70)
7.77 (1.12)
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Low
6.71 (1.70)
7.45 (1.26)

Universalism
Human rights
Empathic concern
Perspective taking
Personal distress
Perceived self-other overlap
Generosity
Altruism

7.85 (1.22)
6.40 (1.83)
6.85 (1.51)
6.33 (1.45)
5.28 (1.88)
7.51 (1.23)
8.07 (1.02)
6.22 (1.71)

7.46 (1.39)
6.01 (2.03)
6.71 (1.62)
6.42 (1.45)
5.40 (1.93)
7.34 (1.40)
5.27 (1.78)
6.36 (1.76)

Table 11. Means (standard deviations) by level of RFM vs. DFM.
Social justice
Benevolence
Universalism
Human rights
Empathic concern
Perspective taking
Personal distress
Perceived self-other overlap
Generosity
Altruism

DFM
6.69 (1.68)
7.55 (1.25)
7.52 (1.40)
6.06 (1.98)
6.61 (1.68)
6.22 (1.49)
5.33 (1.84)
7.38 (1.38)
6.90 (1.94)
6.13 (1.79)

RFM
6.80 (1.72)
7.70 (1.14)
7.83 (1.20)
6.39 (1.86)
6.96 (1.42)
6.53 (1.39)
5.34 (1.97)
7.48 (1.24)
6.72 (2.03)
6.44 (1.66)

6.2.1 Interactions
There was a significant interaction on empathic concern (F = 2.71, p = .101)
and benevolence (F = 2.82, p = .094). In the Duties condition those who were
primed with a distant person had higher empathy toward others whereas in the
Rights condition those who were primed with a close person had higher empathy
toward others. In the distant condition those who were primed with the concept of
duty were more benevolent toward others whereas in the close condition those
who were primed with the concept of rights were more benevolent toward others.
6.2.2 Mixed analysis of variance
Using a mixed analysis of variance while introducing social justice and
generosity as repeated measure revealed that emotional closeness predicted
generosity (F = 406.28, p < .001) whereas it did not predict social justice (F =
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0.02, p = .893). RFM vs. DFM predicted neither generosity (F = 0.81, p = .367)
nor social justice (F = 0.88, p = .349). The interaction between emotional
closeness and two types of prosocial attitudes (generosity vs. social justice) was
also significant (F = 179.30, p < .001). This means that the emotional closeness
significantly predicted generosity more than it did social justice. There was no
effect of RFM vs. DFM on social justice as well as generosity (Fs < 1.00, P >
.300). There was also no significant interaction between RFD vs. DFM and two
types of abovementioned prosocial attitudes (F = 1.85, p = .175). Means and
standard deviations can be found in table 12.
Table 12. Means (standard deviations) by level of two between-ss IVs in the
mixed analysis.
Emotional closeness
Close condition
Distant condition
RFM vs. DFM
RFM
DFM

Generosity

Social justice

8.07 (1.02)
5.27 (1.78)

6.73 (1.70)
6.71 (1.70)

6.72 (2.03)
6.90 (1.94)

6.80 (1.72)
6.64 (1.68)

6.3 Discussion
As predicted, regardless of RFM and DFM conditions, participants who
were in the high rather than low individualized condition had higher scores on
benevolence, universalism, believing in human rights and generosity while there
was no interaction with regard to these DVs. In line with my explanation
individualized interpersonal situations (close vs. distant person) predicted
generosity but not social justice. It is important to note that both of these DVs are
instances of prosocial attitudes except that social justice is more concerned with
social responsibility, i.e. less individualized helping context. This implies that in
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an individualized context the effect of RFM and DFM are the same. In other
words, what this study suggests is that if we want to maximize the prosocial point
of RFM and DFM we need to individualize the context, that is, make it clear that
people should accord rights and fulfill duties to the individual (Study 4 and 5).
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Five studies, together, suggest that rights- as well as duty-focused
mindsets have the potential to motivate people to be more prosocial. Study 1
showed that duty-focused mindsets are associated with prosociality and altruistic
attitudes. In line with the literature on the correlates of human rights, rightsfocused mindsets are associated with prosocial attitudes as well. Moreover, dutyfocused mindsets predicted prosocial attitudes over and beyond rights-focused
mindsets. Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1, again finding that both rightsand duty-focused mindsets are related to prosocial attitudes and altruistic
tendencies, and that the relationship of duty-focused mindsets with prosociality
and altruism cannot be reduced to the overlap between duty- and rights-focused
mindsets (and the latter’s relationship with prosociality and altruism). Study 3
again largely reproduced the pattern of results found in the previous studies at the
level of correlations (i.e. in terms of the relationships between variables). Yet, at
the level of mean differences between Study 3’s DFM and RFM conditions
(between-subjects), Study 3 found that the relatively stronger relationship of dutyfocused mindsets (compared to rights-focused mindsets) to prosociality did not
translate into stronger effects of the between-subjects manipulation (DFM versus
RFM conditions) on prosociality. Rather, participants’ mean responses on some
dependent variables were higher in the RFM than in the DFM condition,
especially in terms of individual morality.
Study 4 and 5 explored the possibility that the stronger effects of rights- as
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compared to duty-focused mindsets in Study 3 were due to rights-focused
mindsets inherently making salient a specific, individualized context in people’s
minds, whereas duty-focused mindsets may not necessarily do so per se (but can
do so). Study 4 provided some evidence for this hypothesis. Using an ecologically
valid paradigm in a different cultural context in which a particular person needed
help, Study 4 showed that the effects of duty-focused mindsets in such an
individualized context was as high as, or even higher than, rights-focused
mindsets. Importantly, at the same time, both duty- and rights-focused mindsets
increased prosociality compared to baseline. Study 5 conceptually replicated and
extended Study 4. As in study 4, study 5 manipulated rights versus duty focused
mindsets. Additionally, it crossed this manipulation with a manipulation of the
individualized context, operationalized by having participants think of either a
close or a distant person in their social worlds (i.e., high versus low individualized
context). In line with my expectations, when participants were asked to think
about a close person whom they would turn to for help in times of hardship, their
subsequently measured prosocial attitudes were higher than when they were asked
to think about a distant person. Importantly, this was so both for participants
primed with a rights-focused mindset and for participants primed with a dutyfocused mindset, suggesting that the effects of duty-focused mindsets on
prosociality can be as strong as those of rights-focused mindset on prosociality as
long as the given situation is put in an individualized context.
In this sense, while the prosocial potential of duty-focused mindsets
depends on the salience of the individualized context— and thus may require
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“extra effort” to be unleashed, compared to rights-focused mindsets— once this
potential is realized, it may be greater than the potential of rights-focused
mindsets. While more research is needed to better understand these nuances,
taking the results of study 4 and 5 together with the first three studies, it appears
safe to say that human prosociality, and therefore humanity, would benefit from
focusing not only on rights, but also on duties.
This work extends and contributes to the present literature on the
psychology of rights and duties in several ways. First, using both correlational
(Study 1 and 2) and experimental (Study 3-5) paradigms, it further consolidated
previous findings according to which rights are associated with prosocial
attitudes. Second, this work introduced additional important concepts in the
existing literature, exploring pre vs. proscriptive norms, agentic vs. communal
values, individual moral foundation, and finally benevolence and universalism as
an additional facets of human prosociality (Study 1-5). Third, it provided
empirical evidence that duty-focused mindsets should be given equal
consideration to rights-focused mindsets when attempting to understand and
increase human morality and prosociality. In doing so, this work also contributes
to, and highlights the importance of, a discourse over duty in the current age that
is dominated by a rather exclusive discourse over rights.
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